Treatment programs for serious offenders such as sex offenders typically include an empathy training component as part of a comprehensive intervention package. The reasons for doing so are partly based on research evidence indicating that social disconnection and relationship ruptures related to empathy failures often trigger offending and also because it is hard for people to grasp how individuals can inflict severe harm on others without lacking empathic capacities. In this paper we examine Philip Kitcher's concept of psychological altruism and altruism failure and consider its conceptual relationship to empathy and morality. We then apply Kitcher's multidimensional concept of altruism to the field of sex offender rehabilitation and argue that it can provide a useful ethical resource through which to approach the various tasks of practice.
Introduction
Being able to emotionally respond to other people and to share their experiences is a core psychological skill and an essential ingredient of healthy intimate relationships and strong communities.
It enables us to enter into individuals' internal worlds and to draw from the knowledge that this imaginative process yields to explain their actions and to predict what they are likely to do next. The capacity to respond in this way has been called empathy, sympathy, emotional knowledge, mind reading, and mentalizing, to name just a few of the concepts evident in the research and popular literature (Decenty, 2012) . The ability to be empathic helps people to act in altruistic ways and to acquire social and moral norms. Its absence is thought to be associated with dysfunctional and destructive social behavior. If you are unable or unwilling to empathize with another person's distress it becomes much more difficult to act in ways that further their interests rather than simply attending to your own. The personal consequences of a failure to empathize with others include social isolation, confusion, and possibly the infliction of formal or informal sanctions by the community.
Given the apparent foundational role of empathy in the establishment and maintenance of social relationships and community cooperation, it is not surprising that developers of programs for sex offenders have included empathy interventions in their list of essential treatment components (e.g., Laws & Ward, 3 2011; Marshall, W. L., Marshall, L. E., Serran, & Fernandez, 2006; Pithers, 1999) . Sexual offences clearly involve the overriding of another persons best interests by an offender, and hence display, at least on the face of it, empathy deficits. However, despite the face validity of including victim empathy interventions in the treatment of sex offenders there is surprisingly little evidence that sex offenders have enduring empathy deficits, or more worryingly, that empathy interventions result in reduced reoffending. According to Mann and Barnett (2013) the problems reside in a weak evidence base and a lack of a coherent model of change.
It seems to us that there are several contestable assumptions underpinning current theoretical and empirical research into the nature and function of victim empathy deficits in sex offenders, and subsequent treatment programs based on this research. These assumptions are (a) empathy deficits represent specific psychological problems that are reliably present (even if specific to a particular victim or context) in individuals who commit sex offences, (b) empathy interventions increase the ability of offenders to respond empathically to potential victims, and (c) offenders who successfully resist the desire to reoffend do so, at least partially, because they have become more empathic. In essence, these assumptions boil down to the claim that empathy related competencies (i.e., perspective taking, emotional responsiveness, according others respect, being able to manage ones own emotional distress etc. -see Barnett & Mann, 2012 ) are necessary and/or 4 sufficient for desistance from sexual offending. The trouble is we lack the evidence to support these assumptions as well as an account of where empathy figures in the rehabilitation process.
In this paper we examine Philip Kitcher's (2010 Kitcher's ( , 2011 concept of psychological altruism and altruism failure and consider its conceptual relationship to empathy and morality. We then apply Kitcher's multidimensional concept of altruism to the field of sex offender rehabilitation and argue that it can provide a useful ethical resource through which to approach the various tasks of practice.
Importantly, the concept of altruism and its five dimensions shifts the focus away from the concept of empathy, which is plagued with definitional vagueness and is somewhat normatively detached (see below), to the theoretically richer and pragmatically more versatile concepts of psychological and behavioral altruism.
The Concept of Empathy
According to Oxley (2011) empathy is "both an act and a capacity" (p. 15). Individuals engage in acts of empathy when they imagine how someone else is likely to be feeling in certain situations, or alternatively, anticipate how they would feel in similar circumstances. In order to act empathically individuals require cognitive and emotional capacities such as the ability to psychologically decenter, emotional knowledge, and the possession of emotional regulation, deliberation, and perspective taking skills.
For example, in order to empathize with a friend's sadness following the death of a parent I need to be able to place myself in her shoes so to speak. Taking in account my friend's personality, circumstances, history, relationships with her parent etc., I imagine what she would feel. This is what has been called other-focused empathy (Oxley, 2012) . Another possible empathic mechanism is to place myself in the situation of my friend and to assume that my parent had just died. Ideally, I would experience similar emotions and therefore be able to accurately infer what she was feeling, thinking, and so on. This type of empathic imaginative process has been labeled self-focused empathy (Oxley, 2012) . It is pretty obvious that sophisticated, empathic actions of these types have significant epistemic or knowledge generating advantages. It helps people to extend their understanding beyond the limited boundaries of their own minds-and bodies-and to establish strong emotional connections to others.
There have been many definition of empathy offered in the philosophical and scientific literature, none universally accepted. Maibom (2012) has usefully distinguished between sympathy, emotional contagion, and empathy while others have added perspective taking, simulation, and imitation to the conceptual mix (Decety, 2012; Oxley, 2011) . Rather than become bogged down in definitional disputes we agree with Oxley (2011) According to this definition, there are a number of possible psychological mechanisms capable of generating an emotional (empathic) response to, for example, a person experiencing sadness. The mechanism could be simple emotional contagion (I feel sad when other person does without necessary being aware of the link), imitation (I copy someone's emotional behaviors and as a result experience a similar emotion), or imagination (e.g., I place myself in someone's situation and anticipate how he or she would be feeling). Forms of empathy that rely on sophisticated cognitive abilities such as self-and -other -focused perspective taking are necessary for morality and complex social functioning.
Empathy is an important motivator for prosocial and moral functioning and therefore it makes sense for treatment programs to devote some of their therapeutic resources to the cultivation of empathy in sex offenders. However, empirical research and theoretical analyses suggest that the presence of empathy on its own does not reliably result in moral and prosocial behavior (Barnett & Mann, 2012; Batson, 2011; Oxley, 2011) . In brief, people are more 7 likely to act empathically towards individuals who are similar to them and fail to do to when others are different on relevant dimensions, such as class or culture. Second, people tend to over privilege current circumstances when considering the interests of others and discount longer term factors. Third, empathy helps to motivate individuals to take into account others' interests but is not a form of ethical or value based deliberation in itself. In other words, it is normatively detached and if it is to lead to prosocial outcomes it needs to be explicitly linked to justified ethical norms. Fourth, people can act in prosocial ways because of their personal commitment to certain ethical norms or due to the anticipated negative consequences of not doing so, rather than because they are empathic. In other words, the occurrence of empathy is not necessary (i.e., other interested actions can occur without the presence of empathy) or sufficient (i.e., the presence of empathy may not result in other interested actions-could reflect bias etc.) for actions that place other peoples' interests above those of the person concerned.
Relatedly, there are empirical and theoretical grounds for arguing that people could commit harmful acts against others in the presence of an empathic response. First, the fact that studies have indicated that some sex offenders do not display empathy deficits does raise the possibility that their offending may occur in the presence of an empathy response. Second, clinical data suggests that sex offenders exhibiting a high degree of emotional congruence 8 towards children and related deviant sexual preferences view themselves as empathic and caring individuals who have sex within the context of a relationship (Navathe, Ward & Rose, 2013) . They may be accurately identifying a (vulnerable and previously abused) child's emotional states and current needs and responding with a similar emotion. Their failure is not so much an empathy one as a moral failure: such individuals have not aligned their actions with consensus norms that are intended to protect children from having sex with adults on the grounds of their vulnerability to exploitation and lack of fully fledged agency.
The Concept of Empathy in the Sexual Offending Field
But how is empathy conceptualized within the field of sexual offending? In three valuable recent papers on empathy and sexual offending theory, assessment, and treatment Barnett and Mann (2012 -different order of authors for the 2013 papers) examined conceptions of empathy in treatment programs, discussing foundational work by theorists such Marshall, Hudson, Jones, and Fernandez (1995 ), Hanson, (2003 ), and Polaschek (2003 .
Following a critical analysis of competing definitions of empathy, Barnett and Mann (2013a) This is an excellent idea, but it may be helpful to be clearer and more explicit when doing this. It may be less confusing to use another term and allow empathy to retain its narrower meaning of an appropriate emotional response to another person's emotional state (see above-Oxley, 2011).
In our view what matters from a treatment perspective is that offenders act towards others in an altruistic manner, rather than that they feel empathic. Additionally, the trouble with the concept of an empathy response as used in the correctional field is that empathy tends to be viewed as either present or absent within an individual and there is a failure to make room for the important role of context and moral norms. First, human beings are not simply empathic (or altruistic) or not; they tend to exhibit a more fine grained picture varying along a number of dimensions (see Kitcher, 2011) . Second, as we will argue below, the concept of psychological and behavioral altruism is underpinned by normative concerns and by virtue of its multidimensional nature, is responsive to issues of context and scope not easily handled by the concept of empathy.
In our view, researchers and practitioners should be concentrating on incidents of altruism failure rather than empathy failure. The concept of altruism (psychological and behavioral), as developed by theorists such as Kitcher, is richer and provides a more useful way of linking ethical norms and concern for others to the kinds of psychological and social interventions employed in treatment programs for sex offenders. The fact that its stress is on action is also an advantage: it is what people do, or fail to do, when committing offences that is of interest to practitioners.
We argue that all of the treatment modules typically implemented with sex offenders play a role in addressing the major classes of problems evident in altruism failure (which includes empathy failure as currently construed). In our view, the multi dimensional, rich account of psychological altruism created by Philip Kitcher (2010 Kitcher ( , 2011 has the conceptual resources to incorporate the contributions that the concept of empathy and the interventions associated with it play in treatment, while avoiding its weaknesses.
A Multidimensional Concept of Psychological Altruism
In the exposition of his ethical theory Philip Kitcher (2010 Kitcher ( , 2011 ) distinguishes between biological, behavioral, and psychological altruism. Biological altruism occurs when a biological entity promotes the reproductive success of another entity at the expense of itself. Essentially, psychological altruism is concerned with the intentions of an agent and is evident when an individual adjusts his/her actions to take into account the interests and desires of other people. Behavioral altruists act to further their own, self-serving interests while seeming to intentionally act in ways that promote others interests. Kitcher argues that ethical norms are especially important in preventing altruism failure by prompting people to behave altruistically even if they are not inclined to do so.
Ideally, we would all be committed and competent psychological altruists but given the complexities of modern living, and taking into account our psychological nature, this is unrealistic. In this paper our focus is solely on psychological and behavioral altruism.
We would now like to look at the concept of psychological altruism more closely. Kitcher (2010) states that:
To be an altruist is to have a particular kind of relational structure in your psychological life -when you come to see that what you do will affect other people, the wants you have, the emotions you feel, the intentions you form change from what they would have been in the absence of that recognition. In offering an analysis of psychological altruism Kitcher (2010, p.123 ) distinguishes between the desires (or other relevant mental states) an altruistic person is likely to have when his/her actions only have consequences for him or herself, and those when his/her actions will have an observable impact on other persons. In this kind of situation (we have paraphrased Kitcher here) he stipulates that (a) the desires an agent acts on will be more closely aligned with those he/she attributes to another person than it would be if he acted in a solitary context; (b) the desire that leads an agent to act follows from his/her perception of the other person's desires; and (c) the desire that caused the agent to act in this context was not intended to further his/her own interests. Rather, he gives priority to the desires of the other persons and relegates his/her own desires to the background. Kitcher makes it clear that there are likely to be other mental states such as emotions that accompany the altruistic person's desires when he/she acts altruistically, for example, compassion or sadness.
Once he defined psychological altruism Kitcher states that because altruism is a multidimensional concept it makes little sense to assert that a person is either altruistic or not. More specifically, Kitcher contends that an individual's altruism profile can be established by using five dimensions. The intensity of an altruistic response involves the degree to which a person realigns their own desires or interests to accommodate those of another. The range of someone's profile refers to the list of people whose desires or interests (could involve all human beings or be restricted to family and friends) he/she normally takes into account when acting. The scope of an altruism profile denotes the internal and external contexts in which an individual is likely to act altruistically. For example, a male might usually take his partner's desires into account in their relationship unless he was feeling angry or depressed. An individual's discernment refers to his/her ability to identify the consequences of his/her actions for relevant others.
Finally, someone's empathetic skills speaks to the ability to accurately infer another persons desires, or more broadly, relevant mental or physical states. This is similar to the notion of perspective taking and theory of mind ability. Kitcher comments that typically individuals' altruistic profiles consist of an inner circle of valued people whose interests they almost always take into account when acting in ways that are likely to influence them. However, it is likely that the interests of persons on the periphery or beyond this circle would be overlooked or downplayed. Third, problematic aspects of the concept of empathy as formulated by theorists and some puzzling research findings can potentially be accommodated by the employment of the concept of psychological altruism. For example, the finding that some sex offenders appear to lack empathy only for their victims rather than for all children or adult females (for example), may reflect a narrowness of range or problem with scope. That is, in certain contexts an individual's normal altruism inclinations are overridden.
In addition, some sex offenders may lack the ability to accurately discern a victim's mental states and thus suffer from skill deficits while another offender may have the relevant skills but fail to utilize them when angry, or sexually aroused (a scope or context failure).
Thus an etiological implication of the psychological altruism perspective is that while sexual offences can occur in the absence of empathy deficits every act of sexual aggression displays a lack of psychological altruism. By way of contrast, the altruism framework also predicts that individuals may inhibit sexually aggressive actions and act altruistically without demonstrating the cognitive and affective elements of an empathic response. This could be because they do not want to let their friends down, because they are committed to specific moral norms, or because they calculate that it is in their best interests to do so. In our experience, offenders often give these types of reasons for inhibiting sexually deviant or aggressive desires and impulses. 
Psychological Altruism and Treatment of Sex Offenders

Aims of rehabilitation
The aims of treatment from the framework of psychological altruism is to make it less probable that an offender will experience altruism failure and therefore fail to take the desires and interests of relevant individuals into account in the course of their daily lives.
Failure to do so could adversely impact on them and other members of the community in two ways. First, once in a high-risk situation, disregarding the desires and interests of a potential victim makes it easier for an individual to commit an offence. Second, consistently acting in ways that ignore the preferences and interests of other people is likely to impair the reintegration process because of the corrosive effects on offenders' vocational, social, and intimate relationships (Ward & Laws, 2010) . A downstream effect of any subsequent social rejection may well be further offending.
Minimizing the likelihood of altruism failures occurring by strengthening the social, psychological and situational constituents of psychological altruism through correctional interventions should also make it easier for offenders to live more fulfilling and meaningful lives.
Etiological Considerations
The Risk-Need-Responsivity model (RNR) of offender rehabilitation states that effective correctional interventions should follow the principles of risk, need, and responsivity. While a number of conceptual and practice problems have been identified in this model, most researchers and practitioners working with offenders agree that ethical and effective practice should be guided by the RNR principles (Ward & Maruna, 2007; Ward & Stewart, 2003) . One core requirement of RNR practice is that clinicians concentrate their therapeutic efforts on managing or eliminating dynamic risk factors.
These psychological and environmental variables are thought to causally contribute to the onset of criminal events and their successful reduction typically results in lowered reoffending rates (Andrews & Bonta, 2010) . The theoretical framework we derived from Kitcher's multidimensional concept of psychological altruism can easily accommodate the RNR principles in the following way.
Criminogenic needs such as offence supportive beliefs and attitudes, intimacy deficits, emotional regulation problems, substance abuse, and impulsivity represent causal variables that are likely to impair the ability of offenders to act in a psychologically altruistic way. For example, offence supportive beliefs, or what have been termed cognitive distortions, typically cast potential victims in ways that permit the offender not to consider them as having the same moral status as them, or else as possessing desires and preferences that make sexual abuse acceptable. This is a problem relating to the range dimension. Two good examples of this type of cognitive distortion are the belief that women are untrustworthy or dangerous, and that children are sexual agents (Gannon & Polaschek, 2006) . The former depicts women as belonging to a class of beings whose desires and interests are not that relevant when engaging in sex and the latter portrays children as competent sexual beings who are capable of making decisions about sex for themselves. We suggest that all of the dimensions of intensity, range, scope, discernment, and empathetic skill can be linked to causal factors resulting in a sexual offence, directly or indirectly (see below).
Assessment
The aim of the assessment phase of sex offender treatment is to systematically collect clinically relevant information about individuals' offending, functional life domains, personal characteristics, and developmental and social history. Once a sex offender's problems have been identified a case formulation (or mini clinical theory) is constructed in which the nature of the problems, their onset, development, and interrelationships are described. We view intensity as a more global capacity that builds on the skills etc. aligned to the other altruism dimensions.
It is anticipated that the answers to the above questions will enable practitioners to pinpoint the reasons why a sex offender acted in ways contrary to the desires and interests of their victim.
This information can then be recruited in the construction of the case formulation and subsequent intervention plan.
Practice
In discussing the practice implications of the theoretical framework derived from Kitcher's concept of psychological altruism, we will describe briefly a number of typical sex offender treatment modules and trace their potential for strengthening altruistic actions. The description of the modules' content is based on our clinical experiences and the work by Marshall et al. (2006) and .
Understanding one's offence/cognitive restructuring
The aim of this treatment module is for offenders to acquire an understanding of their offence process and the psychological and 
Empathy training
As stated earlier in this chapter, the major aim of the empathy module is to encourage offenders to reflect on the impact of sexual abuse on victims and their families. This is achieved through the use of victim biographies, role plays of the index offence, and the assimilation of information about sexual abuse and its consequences for victims. Offenders often describe this as an emotionally devastating experience and report that it helped them to grasp the self-serving nature of their behavior and the callous disregard for the well-being of vulnerable children and unconsenting adults.
Victim perspective taking and appropriate emotional responding are therapeutic targets of this module, and are classical components of an empathy response. In the language of psychological altruism, an expectation is that empathetic accuracy is improved, discernment skills are sharpened, and contextual features of high risk situations that increase the likelihood of sexual crime occurring, are discovered.
Social skills and intimacy interventions
The social skills/intimacy module seeks to equip offenders with the internal and external capabilities to adaptively navigate their way though the social world and to learn how to establish and maintain intimate relationships. Research has indicated that some offenders commit sexual offences because of their feelings of loneliness and social isolation (Ward, Mann, & Gannon, 2007) . In addition, there is emphasis on dealing with social conflicts and learning how to communicate feelings in a range of interpersonal contexts, from work to disagreements in close relationships. There is frequently a problem of range, where the needs and interests of certain people are dismissed as irrelevant, or else are misperceived in ways that promote sexual offending (empathetic skill). There may also be problems of context (e.g., experiencing altruism failure when feeling lonely) that would benefit from therapeutic attention.
Emotional regulation
Emotional regulation modules tend to look closely at offenders' competence on a number of emotional tasks. These include being able to accurately identify and label an emotion, in oneself and in others; once the emotions have been correctly identified, knowing how to act in (adaptive) ways prompted by the emotion in question; and being able to manage powerful emotional states so they do not overwhelm the person concerned.
Powerful emotional states can disinhibit individuals and create immense pressure on them to act non altruistically. For example, if an offender is experiencing strong feelings of anger, self control could prove to be particularly challenging. Norms directing him to attend to his potential sexual partner's desires or preferences may be overlooked and his own desires thought to trump all other motivations; he commits an offence. Alternatively, another sex offender could use sex as a soothing activity and when feeling vulnerable, anxious, or depressed seeks out a sexual partner.
These kinds of problems are unfortunately relatively common and point to issues with psychological altruism. Perhaps the most obvious issue relates to one of internal context, where failure to effectively modulate certain moods makes it hard for an offender to enter act in a psychologically altruistic manner; his own desires and needs take precedence in a context when the reverse should be true.
Problem solving
The final module we will consider is that of problem solving.
Basically, in this module offenders learn how to frame problems and work towards effective solutions. The aim is to increase their ability 
Conclusions
In this paper we have explored the relevance of the concept of empathy for sex offender research and practice. In doing so, it has become apparent that empathy may play an important role in motivating individuals to act in morally acceptable ways, and importantly, to cease offending. After examining empathy and its conceptualization in the sexual offending field more closely, we concluded that the concept of psychological altruism and its associated five dimensions could incorporate valued aspects of empathy, while avoiding some of the conceptual and practice related problems that attend it. After describing Kitcher's concept of psychological altruism, and using it as the basis for an altruism theoretical framework, we investigated its implications for practice.
In our view, the capacity of the psychological altruism concept to provide an ethical and theoretical framework for viewing correctional practice is encouraging. It reminds practitioners that work with sex offenders has a strong normative as well as a scientific or empirical dimension and that the concept of psychological altruism is much better positioned to provide this broader perspective than that of empathy.
